

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

**ATTACK REPORT**

SmoothOperator Campaign Trojanizes 3CXDesktopApp

Date of Publication

March 31, 2023

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2023167

Summary

Attack began: March 22, 2023

Actor: LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA (aka HIDDEN COBRA, Guardians of Peace, ZINC, NICKEL ACADEMY, Lazarus Group)

Malware: ICONIC Stealer or SUDDENICON

Attack Region: Worldwide

Targeted Industries: Automotive, Food & Beverage, Hospitality, Managed Information Technology Service Provider (MSP), Manufacturing

Attack: The 3CX desktop app trojanized via a multi-stage supply attack chain in the SmoothOperator campaign.

🗡️ Attack Regions



⚙️ CVEs

CVE	NAME	AFFECTED PRODUCT	CISA KEV	PATCH
CVE-2023-29059	Arbitrary code execution in 3CXDesktopApp	3CX DesktopApp for Windows Versions: 18.12.407, 18.12.416 & 3CX DesktopApp for macOS Versions: 18.11.1213	✗	✗

Attack Details

#1

The SmoothOperator campaign conducted a supply chain attack targeting downstream customers via rigged installers of a popular conferencing software. The first stage uses a trojanized 3CXDesktopApp, followed by ICO files pulled from Github, ultimately leading to an infostealer dubbed ICONIC Stealer aka SUDDENICONDLL. 3CXDesktopApp is compromised and actively exploited with embedded malicious code (CVE-2023-29059).

#2

The malevolent DLL, which has been sideloaded, includes instructions and a payload encrypted within another DLL using a blob. The shellcode is also present in this blob, which endeavors to retrieve ICO files from GitHub that encompass several URIs for download. The payload is eventually loaded and installed into the targeted environment. The malign behavior comprises beaconing to infrastructure under the control of the attacker, deployment of second-stage payloads, and, in a few instances, direct manipulation of the keyboard.

Recommendations



Security Leaders

Phishing simulations and routine education and awareness training and communications rarely account for MFA fatigue and web browser hygiene. Integrate and communicate all lessons learned.



Security Engineers

- **Uni5 Users:** This is an actionable threat advisory in HivePro Uni5. Prioritize and block all indicators attributed to the threat actors and attacks through your Command Center. Test your controls with Uni5's Breach & Attack Simulation.
- **All Engineers:** Refer to and action upon the 'Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs' & 'Indicators of Compromise (IoC)' on the following pages.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation
<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0006</u> Credential Access	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0008</u> Lateral Movement
<u>TA0009</u> Collection	<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control	<u>T1091</u> Replication Through Removable Media	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter
<u>T1543</u> Create or Modify System Process	<u>T1543.003</u> Windows Service	<u>T1547</u> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	<u>T1547.001</u> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
<u>T1574</u> Hijack Execution Flow	<u>T1574.002</u> DLL Side-Loading	<u>T1056</u> Input Capture	<u>T1071</u> Application Layer Protocol

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
URLs	github[.]com/iconstorages/images https://]www.3cx[.]com/blog/event-trainings/ https://]akamaitechcloudservices[.]com/v2/storage https://]azureonlinestorage[.]com/azure/storage https://]msedgepackageinfo[.]com/microsoft-edge https://]glcloudservice[.]com/v1/console https://]pbxsources[.]com/exchange https://]msstorageazure[.]com/window https://]officestoragebox[.]com/api/session https://]visualstudiofactory[.]com/workload https://]azuredeploystore[.]com/cloud/services https://]msstorageboxes[.]com/office https://]officeaddons[.]com/technologies https://]sourceslabs[.]com/downloads https://]zacharryblogs[.]com/feed https://]pbxcloudeservices[.]com/phonesystem https://]pbxphonenetwork[.]com/voip https://]msedgeupdate[.]net/Windows https://]sbmsa[.]wiki/blog/_insert

TYPE	VALUE
Emails	cliego.garcia@proton[.]me philip.je@proton[.]me
SHA1	cad1120d91b812acafef7175f949dd1b09c6c21a bf939c9c261d27ee7bb92325cc588624fca75429 20d554a80d759c50d6537dd7097fed84dd258b3e 769383fc65d1386dd141c960c9970114547da0c2 3dc840d32ce86cebf657b17cef62814646ba8e98 9e9a5f8d86356796162cee881c843cde9eaedfb3
SHA256	dde03348075512796241389dfea5560c20a3d2a2eac95c894e7bbed 5e85a0acc fad482ded2e25ce9e1dd3d3ecc3227af714bdfbbde04347dbc1b21d6 a3670405 92005051ae314d61074ed94a52e76b1c3e21e7f0e8c1d1fdd497a00 6ce45fa61 b86c695822013483fa4e2dfdf712c5ee777d7b99cbad8c2fa2274b13 3481eadb aa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4f dcf5d868 59e1edf4d82fae4978e97512b0331b7eb21dd4b838b850ba46794d9 c7a2c0983 5407cda7d3a75e7b1e030b1f33337a56f293578ffa8b3ae19c671051 ed314290 e6bbc33815b9f20b0cf832d7401dd893fbc467c800728b5891336706 da0dbcec

References

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<https://www.3cx.com/blog/news/desktopapp-security-alert/>

<https://www.tenable.com/blog/3cx-desktop-app-for-windows-and-macos-reportedly-compromised-in-supply-chain-attack>

<https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/crowdstrike-detects-and-prevents-active-intrusion-campaign-targeting-3cxdesktopapp-customers/>

<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/03/30/supply-chain-attack-against-3cxdesktopapp>


<https://thehackernews.com/2023/03/3cx-supply-chain-attack-heres-what-we.html>

<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032/>

What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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