lazarusholic

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WannaCry: Ransomware attacks show strong links to Lazarus group

2017-05-22, Symantec
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-show-strong-links-lazarus-group
#WannaCry

Contents

Tools and infrastructure used in the WannaCry ransomware attacks have strong links to Lazarus, the group that was responsible for the destructive attacks on Sony Pictures and the theft of US$81 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank. Despite the links to Lazarus, the WannaCry attacks do not bear the hallmarks of a nation-state campaign but are more typical of a cybercrime campaign. Our analysis only allows us to attribute these attacks to the Lazarus group. The technical details do not enable us to attribute the motivations of the attacks to a specific nation state or individuals.
Prior to the global outbreak on May 12, an earlier version of WannaCry (Ransom.Wannacry) was used in a small number of targeted attacks in February, March, and April. This earlier version was almost identical to the version used in May 2017, with the only difference the method of propagation. Analysis of these early WannaCry attacks …

IoC

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